吃瓜大本营

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Today Venezuela, tomorrow Iran: can the Islamic Republic survive a second Trump presidency?

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吃瓜大本营

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Venezuela and Iran flag

Perhaps no one should care more about the of nominal President Nicol谩s Maduro than the Islamic Republic of Iran鈥檚 supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

Khamenei and his regime are in trouble, and it鈥檚 not clear how they would survive should the Trump administration who want a new government system without Khamenei and his ilk.

Iran has no state allies that would be willing to intervene militarily on its behalf. Further, its once-powerful network of partner and proxy militias 鈥 Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and other members of the 鈥 has been rendered incapable or reluctant to get involved. is in shambles in the midst of an ongoing water crisis with no relief in sight.

Further, the to air their grievances against harsh economic conditions as well as government corruption, mismanagement and hypocrisy, echoing similar conditions to Venezuela in recent years.

Lastly, President Donald Trump has returned his attention to Iran. On Jan. 2, Khamenei that if protesters, Iran would be 鈥溾 by the U.S.

Trump鈥檚 warning and show of solidarity will likely embolden protesters, which will almost certainly cause Iran鈥檚 internal security to crack down harder, . Such U.S. intervention could lead to the overthrowing of the ayatollah, intended or not. Furthermore, Maduro鈥檚 fate demonstrates that the Trump administration is willing to use military force for that purpose if deemed necessary.

As an , I believe that these conditions place Khamenei鈥檚 regime under greater threat today than perhaps any other time in its 46-year history.

Protesters and security forces clash in Tehran鈥檚 Grand Bazaar in a video released on Jan. 6, 2026.

Growing threats, internal and external

If Khamenei hopes to survive politically or mortally, I believe he has three options.

First, he could capitulate to . Second, Iran could . Lastly, he could .

In hopes of restoring deterrence, Khamenei could also continue rebuilding his country鈥檚 military capabilities, which were significantly degraded during in which Israel and the U.S. aimed to destroy Iran鈥檚 nuclear capability.

Israel is eager to stifle Iran鈥檚 , , and Trump 鈥 through hostile rhetoric and offensive military action 鈥 has put Khamenei on notice.

Khameini鈥檚 problems aren鈥檛 his alone. The revolutionary theocratic system of government that he leads . And his military and internal security apparatus may not have the time or ability to address its growing and interrelated internal and external threats simultaneously.

There are two fundamental factors analysts like me consider when assessing enemy threats: offensive capability to inflict damage and hostile intentions to use these capabilities to harm enemies.

Determining offensive capability involves evaluating the quality of a country or organization鈥檚 complete arsenal 鈥 air, ground, maritime, cyber and space capabilities 鈥 and how trained, disciplined, integrated and lethal their forces might be. Determining intentions involves evaluating if, when and under what conditions offensive capabilities will be used to achieve their goals.

If states hope to survive when they come under such pressure, their defense strategy should account for differences between their own military capability and the enemy鈥檚, especially if enemies intend to attack. Or states need to convince enemies to be less hostile, if possible.

Maduro鈥檚 mistake was his inability to defend against a far superior U.S. military capability while believing that U.S. leaders would not remove him from office. .

Bad choices

Iran鈥檚 supreme leader faces a similar conundrum: First, there is no foreseeable path that allows Tehran to produce or acquire the military capabilities necessary to deter Israel or defeat the United States, unless Iran develops a nuclear weapon.

And decades of mutual hostility, the memory of and to develop nuclear bombs minimizes the prospect that U.S. leaders view Khamenei鈥檚 intentions as anything but hostile.

But as the clear weaker party, it is in Tehran鈥檚 interest to change Trump鈥檚 mind about Tehran鈥檚 hostile intent. The way to do that would be by abandoning nuclear enrichment.

In terms of threat analysis, the regime鈥檚 oft-repeated of 鈥淒eath to America鈥 and 鈥淒eath to Israel鈥 perhaps have sent an easily misinterpreted message: that Iran鈥檚 hostile leaders intend to destroy the U.S. and Israel. But they simply lack the capability, for now.

President Theodore Roosevelt famously said 鈥.鈥 Today, he might say that Khamenei is unwise for speaking with such vitriol considering the size of Iran鈥檚 stick. The United States and Israel possess military capabilities far superior to Iran鈥檚 鈥 as by the 12-day war 鈥 but they did not then share the same intent. Though both Israel and the U.S. operations shared the of neutralizing Iran鈥檚 nuclear capability, were more broad and included targeting senior Iranian leaders and destabilizing the regime.

To Khamenei鈥檚 momentary personal and institutional fortune, Trump following U.S. B-2 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, delineating the United States鈥 narrower objectives that at the time did not include regime change in Iran.

But that was before U.S. forces removed Maduro from Caracas and before the outbreak of protests in Iran, both of which coincide with Israel鈥檚 signaling preparations for against Iran.

Iran without Khamenei?

During Trump鈥檚 Dec. 29 press conference at Mar-a-Lago with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 鈥 out of Iran if the country reconstitutes its nuclear facilities.

This is separate from the ominuous warning that the U.S. could intervene on behalf of Iranian protesters; it would almost certainly differ in scale.

Nevertheless, a potential U.S. intervention could embolden protesters and further undermine and destabilize the Islamic Republic regime. Khamenei has predictably Trump鈥檚 warning.

I believe this is a serious mistake.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Jan. 3, 2025, that Khameini should not 鈥減lay games鈥 as Maduro did. Khamenei, Rubio said, should take Trump鈥檚 warnings seriously. I agree.

If Iran refrains from violent crackdowns on protesters, there is a chance that anti-government protestors overthrow the government. But the supreme leader鈥檚 chances of surviving a popular uprising are probably greater than surviving an unbridled U.S. or Israeli military intent on ushering in a new 鈥 post-Islamic Republic 鈥 Iran.

Otherwise, Khamenei has to address superior U.S. and Israeli military capability, quickly. But Iran is broke, were not continuously strangling Iran economically, the country could probably never purchase its way to military parity with the or .

Alternatively, Iran could determine that it must move quickly to develop a nuclear weapon to mitigate U.S. and Israeli military capabilities and deter future aggression. However, it is extremely unlikely Iran could do this without U.S. and Israeli intelligence discovering the project, which would immediately trigger an overwhelming military campaign that would likely expedite regime change in Iran.

And like Maduro, the supreme leader is utterly alone. None of Maduro鈥檚 closest partners 鈥 China, Russia, Cuba and even Iran 鈥 were willing to fight in his defense, despite weeks of forewarning and near Venezuela.

Under these circumstances, it may be impossible for Khamenei to address overwhelming U.S. and Israeli military capabilities. He could, however, reduce the threat by doing what is necessary to ensure the United States鈥 objectives for Iran remain narrow and focused on the nuclear program, which may also keep Israel at bay.

However, Khamenei would have to demonstrate unprecedented restraint from cracking down violently on protesters and a willingness to give up nuclear enrichment. Due to historical animosity and distrust toward the U.S., both are unlikely, increasing, I believe, the probability of a forthcoming Iran without Khamenei.The Conversation

, Fellow at the Center for Middle East Studies,

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